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Abstract: In seven paragraphs written in 1893, Peirce puts forward a puzzling and 
thought-provoking claim about the role of rather mysterious “skeleton-sets” in processes 
of association of ideas: all association of ideas, either by resemblance or by contiguity, 
requires and involves “skeleton sets”, whose iconic dimension is necessary for these 
processes to take place. Because it relates to the question of the nature and mode of 
the existence of ideas, to that of the role of icons in thought, and to that of the content 
of concepts, this thesis is clearly of great importance for Peirce’s philosophical system. 
In this paper, I would like to examine two questions: (1) what is the justifi cation of 
Peirce’s claim that “skeleton-sets”, or “skeleton ideas”, are necessary for an association 
of ideas – by resemblance or by contiguity – to take place in one’s mind? (2) Is this 
claim compatible with Peirce’s philosophical system?
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In this short paper, I want to focus on seven paragraphs written by Peirce in 1893, in 
which he puts forward a puzzling and thought-provoking claim about the role of rather 
mysterious “skeleton-sets” in processes of association of ideas: all association of ideas, 
either by resemblance or by contiguity, requires and involves “skeleton-sets”, whose 
iconic dimension is necessary for these processes to take place. As far as I know, neither 
this thesis – which does not appear anywhere else in Peirce’s writings – nor the exact 
nature of these skeleton-sets has received proper attention from Peirce scholars. Yet 
because it relates to the question of the nature and mode of the existence of ideas, to 
that of the role of icons in thought, and to that of the content of concepts, this thesis is 
clearly of great importance for Peirce’s philosophical system. Since the paragraphs in 
which this thesis is expressed have been largely overlooked in the Peircean literature, 
it will certainly be helpful to begin by quoting at length the passages in which Peirce 
most clearly expresses it:
Sign Systems Studies 43(4), 2015, 576–583
http://dx.doi.org/10.12697/SSS.2015.43.4.12
 Some perplexities about Peirce’s “skeleton ideas”  577
I hear at this moment a bird calling. I think he is on a lilac-tree close by the 
verandah. Every time he calls, I seem to see the bird. It is not much like seeing, but 
still it is a visual idea. Now that visual idea I think of as the bird itself, and the call 
I think of as something appertaining to that idea [...]. But I have besides the visual 
idea of the bird and the sound of the call, a skeleton idea of connection between two 
things. It is a dim idea in itself; but if I want to think about it, I have a visual idea of 
two dots connected by a line, or of a knot in a string. However, when I just think of 
the bird calling, I do not think the idea of connection so distinctly. Nevertheless, 
I do think it, and think of the call and the visual bird as belonging to it. Under 
ordinary circumstances, I might not remark the idea of connection; but potentially 
it would be there, that is, it would be all ready to be called into existence, as soon 
as there should be need of it. (CP 7.426)
In all association, even by contiguity, the potential idea of the form of the set 
is operative. It is the instrument without which the association would take no 
hold upon the mind. It is not necessary that the formal idea should be clearly 
apprehended [...]. Th e skeleton of the set is something of which a mathematical 
diagram can be made. It is something in itself intelligible; though it is not necessary 
that it should emerge into the fi eld of easy attention. (CP 7.427)
I saw a lady yesterday. I had not seen her since one evening when she and her 
husband drove up as my wife and I were standing at the well. A handsome man! He 
and she are both very fond of his nephew who seems to us too a charming fellow; 
and only yesterday my wife showed me a newspaper-paragraph that he had been 
arrested for debt. So his centi-millionaire cousin paid his tailor’s bill of $5000. Th e 
last time I saw him he was hardly presentable. So my thoughts ran on in spite of 
me. First, the lady. Th en, she in a set with her husband, my wife, myself, the buggy, 
and the well. Th en mingles with this set another, the lady, her husband, my wife, 
myself, the nephew, and his agreeability; now that nephew brings in something 
concentrating him, my wife, myself, the newspaper. I forget the others. Th en, him, 
and that Newport house, and the Croesus cousin. Th e skeleton-sets themselves I 
do not think particularly about; but they are operative. Th e marriage relation, the 
familiar intercourse of people in the country, the relation of handsome nephew 
to a message; newspaper-publications about people; the relation of a man of 
stupendous fortune to his cousins. All of these skeleton-sets, though not attended 
to, infl uenced my thought; and they followed one another by the same alternating 
process of taking up and dropping. (CP 7.431)
When these skeleton-sets were joined intermediately to the passage from one to 
another, these connections of them had their skeleton-sets. But these latter were 
all of that simple form expressible by the sign +, and had no specifi c character. 
Th ere are, however, cases in which the connections of the skeleton-sets have 
skeleton-sets of more interest. (CP 7.432)
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In this paper, I would like to examine two questions: (1) what is the justifi cation of 
Peirce’s claim that ‘skeleton-sets’, or ‘skeleton ideas’, are necessary for an association 
of ideas – by resemblance or by contiguity – to take place in one’s mind? (2) Is this 
claim compatible with Peirce’s philosophical system?1 In order to address these two 
questions, I shall fi rst consider four objections that, having read the passages quoted 
above, one might be spontaneously inclined to pose against Peirce’s claim and his 
mode of argumentation. Two of these objections show that his thesis about the role of 
skeleton-sets does not seem to be consistent with his philosophical system as a whole 
[objections (1) and (3)]; and the other two – which are neither based on this system, 
nor about the internal coherence of his views – indicate that what he puts forward in 
these passages seems rather implausible [objections (2) and (4)]. As a result, this series 
of objections will make it clear that Peirce’s point in these passages is particularly 
diffi  cult to grasp and hence to defend. More specifi cally, the objections will outline 
how Peirce’s claim should certainly not be understood.
(1) If it is true that “in all association, even by contiguity, the potential idea of 
the form of the set is operative [and] is the instrument without which the association 
would take no hold upon the mind” (CP 7.427), then this means that skeleton ideas act 
upon us without having to be interpreted. As such, they possess a kind of univocality 
that Peirce refuses to attribute to any sign (perhaps with the exception of pure index). 
Even in the dialogue that, for Peirce, is constitutive of thinking – where our “self of 
one instant appeals to [our] deeper self for his assent” – this dialogue is “conducted in 
signs that are mainly of the same general structure as words” (CP 6.338). Accordingly, 
we have to express our thoughts “so that that virtually other person may understand 
it” (CP 7.103). In such a dialogue, we can employ a language “that is free from much 
explanation that would be needed in explaining oneself to quite a diff erent person”, 
but we nonetheless have to “establish conventions” with ourselves in order to be 
understood by that virtually other person (CP 7.103).
(2) If we follow the line of reasoning advanced by Peirce in these paragraphs, an 
infi nite regress seems to loom: if any sequence of ideas A and B implies an operative 
icon of the form of their relation, and if this icon is itself an idea, then it seems to ensue 
that another operative icon has to intervene in the course of the process in question: 
1 Before dealing with these questions, it is important to note that we should not place 
too much importance on Peirce’s employment of the concept of skeleton, since he oft en 
interchangeably uses ‘skeleton-diagram’ and ‘outline sketch’ in his writings (cf. CP 2.227). In 
mathematics, however, an object and its skeleton are homotopic without being homeomorphic. 
Th e function of the schematic dimension of the skeleton is to emphasise this homotopy, and so 
to facilitate analysis of some of the properties of the object that is homotopically represented. 
In the paragraphs under consideration, the use of the concept of skeleton is simply due to the 
fact that the schemas in question consist in a certain number of dots connected by lines in a 
way that is similar to the way in which the ideas so represented are connected.
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an operative icon of the relation between, on the one hand, the ideas A and B, and, 
on the other, the operative icon that was supposed connect A and B together. And so 
on, ad infi nitum.
(3) Th e way in which Peirce conceives of relations between ideas here involves a 
discontinuist conception of intellectual life that is in confl ict with what he repeatedly 
claims in his writings: if our ideas are like the dots of a skeleton, in which certain 
connections are established with other dots, and if these skeletons are themselves 
connected in the same way to other skeletons, this entails (a) a holistic view of the 
content of our ideas, but also (b) an atomistic view of these ideas themselves.
It entails a holistic view of their content because determining what has been 
thought at a given moment requires taking into account the whole network of ideas 
and the skeletons of ideas in which all our ideas are connected. [In a similar spirit, 
“our whole past experience” is for Peirce “continually in our consciousness, though 
most of it sunk to a great depth of dimness” (CP 7.547)].
It entails an atomistic view of our ideas because if our ideas are like the 
interconnected dots of a skeleton, this interconnection is that of absolutely distinct 
or discrete elements: dots, or skeletons made of lines and dots. Now, such a view is 
incompatible with Peirce’s claim that “an idea is nothing but a portion of consciousness 
having in itself no defi nite boundaries, except so far as it may be of a diff erent quality 
from contiguous ideas” (CP 7.553n). For Peirce, the sole “law of mind” is that “ideas 
tend to spread continuously and to aff ect certain others which stand to them in a 
peculiar relation of aff ectability” (CP 6.104, my emphasis) – or, more precisely, tend 
to “attach themselves in thought so as to form systems” (CP 7.467). Th us, “that ideas 
can nowise be connected without continuity is suffi  ciently evident to one who refl ects 
upon the matter” (CP 6.143). Th e inferential/associative processes of which our psychic 
or cognitive life is constituted would not occur without continuity – i.e. ideas would 
not have this tendency to aff ect certain others without continuity: continuity “makes 
the connection of ideas possible” (CP 6.143). Accordingly, if:
[...] we regard ideas from a nominalistic, individualistic, sensualistic way, the 
simplest facts of mind become utterly meaningless. Th at one idea should resemble 
another or infl uence another, or that one state of mind should so much as be 
thought of in another, is, from that standpoint, sheer nonsense. (CP 6.150)
Because for Peirce “an idea is nothing but a portion of consciousness having in itself 
no defi nite boundaries, except so far as it may be of a diff erent quality from contiguous 
ideas” (CP 7.553n), it can be argued that our ideas – whose essential property is this 
“lack of haecceity” that renders the psychic life continuous – become at the same time 
individualized in virtue of this continuity. However, they do not thereby become 
entirely devoid of their inherent indetermination.
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In this respect, we should be careful not to suppose that ideas, as they are, or as they 
pass through our minds at any given moment, really possess the kind of individuality 
that they appear to possess when we are trying to grasp what we had in mind in a given 
moment and propositionally identify them. It is “practically speaking” only that “there is 
a fl ow of ideas through the mind, that is, of objects, of which we have the barest glimpse 
while they are with us, but which are reported by memory aft er they have been associated 
together and considerably transformed” (CP 7.424, emphasis added). In other words, 
it is the action of refl exively identifying our ideas that cuts this fl ow into distinct and 
separate entities – which are supposed to make true or false our refl exive thoughts about 
what we had in mind in a certain moment (cf. CP 7.636). Th ese entities are “subsequent 
creations”, “imaginary objects”, but not the “train of ideas”, “the movement of mind 
itself” (CP 7.376). Correlatively, our ideas can become objects of thought and knowledge 
only once they have begun to generalize: “By the time we can examine our ideas at all, 
we fi nd the process of combining them into sets has begun” (CP 7.426).
(4) Th e fourth and last objection is that the idea expressed in CP 7.431 looks 
unacceptable if it is understood in the following way: when Peirce’s thoughts run 
on in spite of him during his conversation with the lady about her nephew, he is 
indistinctively, and implicitly, thinking about things such as “[t]he marriage relation, 
the familiar intercourse of people in the country, the relation of handsome nephew to 
a message; newspaper-publications about people; the relation of a man of stupendous 
fortune to his cousins”. In other words, Peirce’s refl exive attention, or focus, is not 
directly turned towards such things, but he nevertheless really thinks about them. 
Th is seems particularly implausible, because when one judges that S is P, it is certainly 
not true, for instance, that one is thereby ipso facto thinking about everything that 
one takes to be true of S and of what possesses the property P.
If all or some of the foregoing objections I have articulated are – as I tend to 
think – legitimate, they illustrate a way in which Peirce’s claim that all association 
of ideas, either by resemblance or by contiguity, requires and involves skeleton sets 
should not be understood. Th is is not enough, however, to conclude that we would be 
better off  setting aside this claim when it comes to building a coherent and plausible 
interpretation of Peirce’s view on the process of the association of ideas. Indeed, since, 
as I indicated at the beginning of this paper, this claim and the way Peirce argues 
for it directly involve and concern his view of the nature and mode of the existence 
of ideas, the role of icons in thought, and the content of concepts, it cannot but be 
of central importance. Moreover, because – as I shall emphasize in the rest of this 
paper – this claim about the role and nature of skeleton-sets clearly echoes some 
well-known remarks made by Peirce in 1893 about the association of ideas and the 
nature of concepts, it can be argued that setting aside this claim would come down to 
depriving ourselves of crucial textual resources when it comes to understanding the 
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exact signifi cance of these remarks. More generally, I shall suggest that by comparing 
these remarks with the claim that stands at the centre of this paper, new light can be 
shed on them and a deeper understanding gained. 
Let us fi rst consider the following possible interpretation of CP 7.431: while Peirce 
is really and distinctively thinking about the lady, her husband, his wife, the nephew, 
his agreeability, the newspaper, the Newport house, and the Croesus cousin, he has 
in mind, in some vague sense, the “visual idea” of a series of skeletons (that is, of dots 
connected by lines). And this series of skeletons is nothing but Peirce’s conception 
of the “marriage relation, of the familiar intercourse of people in the country, of the 
relation of handsome nephew to a message; or of the relation of a man of stupendous 
fortune to his cousins”. Th ey have infl uenced Peirce’s thought, even while they are 
“not attended to”. Most importantly, it is because “the potential idea of the form of the 
set is operative” even if not attended to, that such an inferential or associative process 
takes place in Peirce’s mind.
As it stands, such a view is rather obscure. However, it might become clearer if we 
relate it to two other passages from Peirce, both written in the same year – 1893. Here 
is the fi rst: a concept is not “a mere jumble of particulars [... but] the living infl uence 
upon us of a diagram, or icon, with whose several parts are connected in thought an 
equal number of feelings or ideas” (CP 7.467). Moreover – Peirce goes on to argue –, 
this diagram or icon “is not always clearly apprehended” (CP 7.467).
Th e second passage is about association by resemblance. For Peirce, in this kind 
of association, ideas are not associated on the basis of an intrinsic similitude that is 
discerned in them aft er a sort of (subconscious) mental inspection: “Th e similarity 
of two ideas consists in the fact that the mind naturally joins them in thought in a 
certain way” (CP 7.392; cf. CP 4157). As Peirce writes elsewhere: “without association 
by resemblance there could be no general ideas and no resemblances” (CP 7.498). He 
explains this view as follows:
I fi nd myself disposed to say [that two ideas] are closely allied; in that disposition 
their similarity consists. For they are two diff erent ideas [... and therefore] have 
nothing in common, unless it be that the mind naturally throws them together. 
(CP 7.392)
More exactly, these two ideas have in common the fact that they “act alike”: due to (a) 
their iconic qualities, and (b) the inward or “occult nature of ideas and of the mind”, 
they have been placed or “associated” into the same “set”, or “connecting idea” (CP 
7.392). Th erefore, the association (or “suggestion”) by resemblance of an idea with (or 
by) another is always indirect for Peirce: an idea fi rst and directly “calls up the idea of 
the set in which the mind’s occult virtue places it, and that conception perhaps gives, 
owing to some other circumstance, another of the particular ideas of the same set” 
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(CP 7.392). According to Peirce, the same goes for association by contiguity, where 
“an idea calls up the idea of the set in which experience has placed it, and thence one 
of the other ideas of that set” (CP 7.392).
Th e claims defended in these two passages – that a concept is not “a mere jumble 
of particulars […but] the living infl uence upon us of a diagram, or icon, with whose 
several parts are connected in thought an equal number of feelings or ideas” (CP 
7.467), and that association by resemblance and by contiguity are indirect, since an 
idea fi rst and directly calls up the idea of the set – indisputably echo the point Peirce 
intends to make about “skeleton-sets”: namely, that without them there would be no 
inferential or associative processes, either by contiguity or by resemblance, and that 
this is so because “the potential idea of the form of the set is operative” in our minds 
(in other words, has a “living infl uence upon us”).2
What is also indisputable is, fi rst, that for Peirce these skeleton-sets should not be 
conceived as representations or mental images, which would merely accompany one’s 
thought processes, but not be required for them to take place. Th ese skeleton-sets or 
ideas do not explain why a given particular idea has been associated in one’s mind with 
another particular idea, but they do explain why it was possible for them to be associated. 
Second, skeleton-sets could not play this role for Peirce if they were not iconic in nature 
– that is, if they did not have a form. Th ird, being operative while being potential in 
nature, the skeleton-sets can be viewed as cognitive habits, or directly related to them 
(which means for Peirce that they do not simply consist in composite or general ideas). 
Hence, these skeleton-sets could arguably be characterized as the form of our cognitive 
habits. Th is implies that these habits (which are our conceptions, for Peirce) have to have 
an iconic dimension in order to exert any power over us. Fourth, skeleton-sets indicate 
both the structure of our thoughts and their content. Fift h, the way in which a given 
mind operates when some of its ideas are associated needs to be at least vaguely or tacitly 
perceived by that mind in order for such an operation to take place.
All of this is – just as in the passages I cited at the beginning of this paper – rather 
sketchy. But the issue should, in my opinion, receive more attention from Peirce 
scholars – in particular when it comes to determining the exact role and nature of the 
infamous “composite photographs” which, according to Peirce, are involved in any of 
our predicative judgments.3 My sole aim in this paper was to emphasize the importance 
of the claim, made in some paragraphs curiously neglected by Peirce scholars, that 
all association of ideas requires and involves “skeleton-sets”, whose iconic dimension 
2 Another claim, also from 1893, is comparable to the “skeleton-sets” thesis: namely that a 
natural-language sentence like “Every woman loves some child of hers” can be depicted as a 
“neural net”, in which it is made obvious “that inherence, which it is the peculiar function of 
categorical propositions to express, is nothing but a special variety of connection” (MS 410). 
I owe this idea to Ahti Pietarinen. 
3 See, on this issue, Hookway 2002, 2007, and Gaultier 2014.
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is necessary for these processes to take place; to show how this claim should not be 
understood; and to indicate the direction in which we should proceed to make sense 
of this claim and consider defending it.
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Некоторые недоумения по поводу “скелет-идей” Пирса
В семи обзацах, написанных в 1893 году, Пирс выдвигает заявление о роли довольно 
загадочных “скелет-наборов” в процессах ассоциации идей: все ассоциации идей, 
либо по сходству или по смежности, требуют и предполагают иконических «скелет-
множеств». Этот тезис явно имеет большое значение для философской системы Пирса. 
В этой статье я хотел бы рассмотреть два вопроса: (1) что обосновывает идею Пирса, что 
«скелет-множества» или «скелет идеи» необходимы для объединения идей по сходству 
или по смежности? (2) совместим ли это требование с философской системы Пирса?
Mõned hämmingukohad seoses Peirce’i “skelettideedega”
Seitsmes 1893. aastal kirjutatud lõigus esitab Peirce raskestimõistetava ning mõtlemaärgitava 
väite üsnagi mõistatuslike “skelettkomplektide” rolli kohta ideede assotsieerumisprotsessides: 
kõik ideedeassotsiatsioonid, olgu siis sarnasusel või kaasnevusel põhinevad, nõuavad 
ja sisaldavad “skelettkomplekte”, mille ikooniline mõõde on vajalik nende protsesside 
toimumiseks. Et see on seotud ideede olemasolu olemuse ja viisi küsimusega, ikooni rolli 
küsimusega mõtlemises ja mõistete sisu küsimusega on see tees Peirce’i fi losoofi lise süsteemi 
jaoks ilmselgelt oluline. Käesolevas artiklis tahaksin vaadelda kahte küsimust: (1) mis õigustab 
Peirce’i väidet, et “skelettkomplektid” või “skelettideed” on vajalikud, et kellegi mõtetes leiaks 
aset ideede assotsieerumine – kas sarnasuse või kaasnevuse kaudu; ja (2) kas see väide sobib 
Peirce’i fi losoofi lise süsteemiga?
